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PRESUMPTIONS AND MODAL LOGIC:
A HOHFELDIAN APPROACH
JOHN P. FINAN*
T HE DIFFICULTY of distinguishing between an inference and a pre-
sumption, a difficulty that bedevils tort and evidence teachers, (see Ap-
pendix I) among others, may be dispelled by a study of the deontic nature of
permissible inferences and presumptions.' Using scholastic terminology, an in-
ference is a function of the intellect, not the will. Therefore, deontic notions
of permission and duty seem foreign to inference. However, deontic notions
are legitimate, because the law, in assigning a fact finding function to judge
and jury, uses deontic notions in assigning fact finding competence Thus,
the statement that an inference is not permissible means that insufficient
evidence has been introduced to permit the jury to find the fact in question.
It does not matter whether the jury, by applying its collective intelligence,
would draw the inference. Their incompetence to draw the inference is not
a function of rationality,3 but of a rule of law that deprives them of compe-
tence.
A presumption is the opposite of a permissible inference; the jury is
directed to find the presumed fact regardless of its assessment of the proba-
tive force of the evidence. That is because the law directs that a fact be
found, that an inference be drawn, absent rebuttal.4 If the presumption is
*Professor of Law, The University of Akron School of Law, Akron, Ohio; A.B., Fordhan
University, 1956; J.D., Columbia University School of Law, 1961.
1 Deontic notions are treated by Hohfeld in his analysis of rights and privilege, HOHFELD,
FUNDAMENTAL LEoAL CONCEPTIONS, ch. 1 (W. COOK ed. 1919). See also R. DIAS, JURISPRUD-
ENCE, ch. 2 (4th ed. 1976).His treatment of jural relations also includes the notion of
power, which is not deontic and is perhaps alethic. See Appendix II for a catalogue of
Hohfeld's relations and their formulation in terms of modal logic. A square of opposition
for deontic relationships is also included in Appendix II for the convenience of the reader
in drawing immediate inferences.
2 Furthermore logical operators used in examining truth functional compound statements
may be used in examining compound statements whose components are not truth functional.
See A. Ross, DIRECTIVES AND NORMS at 139-43 (1968). On p. 143 Ross states:
It is to be sure, correct that the logical connectives and inferences which operate in
directive speech cannot, if we accept that directives are without truth-value, be inter-
preted as truth-functions and truth relations. Since they do actually function in directive
speech the natural question is whether they might be interpreted in some other way.
If it could be shown that the connectives, as they function in directive discourse, are
definable by means of value tables analogous to those we know from ordinary logic,
the only difference being that the two indefinables are interpreted as referring not to
truth and falsity, but to another pair of values, then it would be unreasonable not to
characterize the relations defined in this way as logical. Deontic logic would then be
on a level with the traditional propositional calculus-a new interpretation of the same
formal system, of equal status with the old. (Emphasis in original).
. In saying that rationality is irrevelant, we of course refer to the jury's assessment of
rationality. The reason for the command not to draw the inference is often, though not
always, based on the rationality of a higher court or legislature, which has determined that,
if a jury should find a fact, it would not be acting rationally. In a case without a jury,
a certain legislative body or superior court has decided that the trial judge may not find a
given fact.
4 At least in civil cases. See McCoRMICK, EVIDENCE, § 342 (2d ed. 1972).
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conclusive, then the rebuttal is irrelevant because the command to draw
the inference is unconditional. Thus there are three classifications:
1) impermissible inferences;
2) mandatory inferences; and
3) jury questions (inference is neither impermissible nor mandatory),
or judge questions (in cases without a jury, if appellate court and
legislature permit but do not mandate the inference).
The term "permissible inference" is used to refer to the third classifi-
cation.
Usually the direction is conditional: If you find the basic fact, you
are directed to find the ultimate (operative) fact. Sometimes the presumed
fact is an intermediate evidentiary fact, in which case the presumption is a
so-called tactical presumption. However, for economy of style, we will refer
to the presumed fact as an ultimate fact, except in those cases where our
analysis would be affected by the characterization of the presumed fact.
The term ultimate fact is not easy to define. The following definitions
are found in Black's Law Dictionary:I
Facts necessary and essential for decision by court. Those facts
found in that vaguely defined field lying between evidential facts on
the one side and the primary issue or conclusion of law on the other,
being but the logical results of the proofs, or in other words, mere
conclusions of fact.
Consider the following: Ultimate facts are facts which are of conse-
quence to the determination of an action, not because they support a further
inference, but because under the substantive law and the pleadings they
are of consequence in and of themselves. An ultimate fact is a fact which
is a necessary but not necessarily a sufficient condition of recovery or con-
viction.
An evidentiary fact is a necessary condition of liability only if basing
an inference on it is the only possible way to prove a fact necessary to the
outcome of a case. It is well nigh inconceivable that an evidentiary fact will
ever be logically necessary, although it may be practically necessary, given
the difficulty of obtaining other proof. Even if necessary, however, an
evidentiary fact would not fit the above definition of an ultimate fact be-
cause, by definition, its function is to provide the basis for a further infer-
ence.
An element of a crime is a necessary condition of conviction and
hence an ultimate fact. If there is only one element, it is also a sufficient
condition. However, if there is more than one element, as there usually
is, then it is not a sufficient condition.
5BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1691-92 (4th ed. rev. 1968).
[Vol. 13:1
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A permissible inference is symbolized as follows:0
P H (x," p, y)
It is permissible that x (the trier of fact) find the ulti-
mate fact.8
Every inference requires a basic fact. So we have:
BF )9 PH (x, p, y)
If the basic fact is established, then, it is permissible
that x (the trier of fact) find the ultimate fact.
A mandatory inference is symbolized as follows:
OH (x, p, y)
It is obligatory that x (the trier of fact) find the ulti-
mate fact. Adding the basic fact, we have:
BF ) OH (x, p,y)
If the basic fact is established, then it is obligatory that
x (the trier of fact) find the ultimate fact.
The above is a conclusive presumption. A rebuttable presumption is
symbolized as follows:
(B F and9R) ' ) OH (x, p, y)
If basic fact is established and the ultimate fact is not
rebutted, then it is obligatory that x (the trier of fact)
find the ultimate fact.
Using equivalent terminology, a permissible inference equals either
PH (x, p,y)
or
OH (x, p, y)
The latter means, it is not obligatory that x not find the ultimate fact.
This formulation does not warn us of difficulty. However, difficulty becomes
6The reader is directed to Appendix II and to the following articles: Mullock, Holmes
on Contractual Duty, 33 Prrr. L. REV. 471 (1972), and Anderson, The Logic of Hoh-
feldian Propositions, 33 PITT. L. REV. 29 (1972), which will provide the necessary
theoretical background for an understanding of the remainder of this article. Note that this
article follows Anderson's article in usinig H, instead of M which Professor Mullock uses,
for the 3-place predicate.
Note also that this article uses D more broadly than does Professor Mullock, as explained
in Appendix II which should be consulted at this time.
7 x = trier of fact. (jury or judge as the case may be).
8 A more accurate, but certainly awkward, translation reads:
It is permissible (P) that the trier of fact (x) bring about (H) the social condition (p)
with respect to the person who will suffer a legal detriment (y) if the inference is
drawn. For convenience we will refer to y as the defendant, with the understanding
that this is not always the case (e.g., if defendant is asserting an affirmative defense).
9) = implies or more precisely.... ) ... - If... then...
10"And" is usually symbolized but since its symbolization can not be reproduced, the full
word is used.
11 - - not. 1 = not R = the presumption is not rebutted.
Summer, 19791
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apparent when we consider the negative formulation of a permissible in-
ference, the so called impermissible inference.
The negative is formulated as follows:
V H (x, p, y) which is equivalent to O'H (x, p, y).12
The former, in non-symbolic language reads: It is not permissible that
x find the ultimate fact. The latter, in non-symbolic language reads: It is
obligatory that x not find the ultimate fact.
Stated more conventionally, the former may be translated to read:
I. The jury is not permitted to find the ultimate fact,
and the latter may be translated to read:
II. The jury is obliged (has a duty) not to find the
ultimate fact.
Translation No. II above probably is the best rendition to demonstrate
the inaccuracy of the formulation. It is inaccurate because the jury lacks
the power to find the ultimate fact; and is senseless to speak of a duty not to
create a legal relationship if one lacks the power to create it. It is the judge
who has the duty, the duty not to empower the jury to find the ultimate
fact. Thus, formulated accurately, a permissible inference is a mandatory
one; the judge has a duty, formulated as follows:
I 0 H" (j, Dp,18 y)
or
II PH (j," Dp, y)
I = it is obligatory that the judge not empower the
jury to find the ultimate fact.
II = it is not permissible that the judge empower the
jury to find the ultimate fact.
The judge's duty is twofold: he has a duty not to empower the jury
and he has a duty to find that the ultimate fact is false. His second duty may
be formulated as follows:
OH (j, p, y)
or
P.H (j,p, y)
What of presumptions? With respect to "impermissible inferences," it
is clear that the jury has no power to find the ultimate fact. Thus, it is
12 See Appendix II, p.19.
13 Note that this a mixed modality involving a duty not to create a power. If power is
symbolized Z H (x, Dp, y) and if Dp is shorthand for Z H (x, Dp, y), then 0 ff (j, Dp, y) is
shorthand for 0 R (j, Z H (x, Dp, y),y). See Appendix II.
14 j - judge.
[Vol. 13:1
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senseless to speak of a duty not to find the fact. With presumptions, how-
ever, the matter is more complex.
If a jury is required to find the ultimate fact, given a finding that the
basic fact exists, then, unless the ultimate fact is rebutted by a preponder-
ance of the evidence (or -other requisite quantum), we have a so called
"tough presumption." If we are dealing with a tough presumption and the
judge finds, as a matter of law, that the basic fact has been established and
that the evidence rebutting the ultimate fact is insufficient to support a jury
verdict, then the case does not go to the jury, and the jury has no power
to find that the ultimate fact is not true. Hence it would be senseless to
speak of their duty not to find the ultimate fact. On the other hand, if
there is enough evidence to support a jury verdict that the basic fact is true
but not enough evidence to obtain a peremptory ruling that the basic fact is
true, and if there is enough evidence rebutting the ultimate fact to support
a jury finding that the ultimate fact is false, but not enough to obtain a
peremptory ruling, then the jury has the power either to find or not to find
the ultimate fact under the following instructions:
If you find that the proponent has proved the basic fact by a preponder-
ance of the evidence (or other requisite quantum) and you find that
the opponent has failed to rebut the ultimate fact by a preponderance
of the evidence (or other requisite quantum), then you are directed
to find that the ultimate fact is true.
If the jury should find that the basic fact is true and that the rebutting
evidence is insufficient to carry the opponent's burden of rebutting the
truth of the ultimate fact then it has the duty to find that the ultimate fact
is true, but it also has the power to breach that duty, at least under a general
verdict. Thus, if a jury should find that the ultimate fact does not exist, it
would have exercised a power to affect legal relations and at the same time
have breached a duty.
The notion of a power coexisting with a duty not to exercise the power
is not an unfamiliar one in the law.1" For example, when a creditor in a
suretyship situation releases a principal debtor with a "reservation of rights,"
the release is treated as a covenant not to sue. In this situation, the creditor has
both the duty not to sue, and the power to sue."0 Thus, presumptions must be
broken down into two categories. The first is where the jury lacks power, as
when the judge finds an ultimate fact as a matter of law without submitting
an issue to the jury. The second is where the jury, though having the power
not to, has a duty to find the ultimate fact. Here the jury may" breach its
15 See Appendix II.
16 See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 170, Illustration 1 (Tent. Draft Nos.
1-7 rev. & ed. 1973), where an obligee, prior to the obligors receiving notification of an
assignment, has the power to discharge the debtor-obligor by receiving payment. Surely the
obligee, who has assigned his claim, has a duty not to discharge the obligor.
17 Has the power to breach its duty.
Summer, 19791
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duty. In the first situation, the formulation of the legal relationships would
be Z H (x, Dp, y)."a In the second situation, where the jury has the power,
but the duty not to exercise the power, the appropriate formulation would
require two modal propositions as follows:
1) ZP (x, Dp, y)
x has the power to create a certain modal (in this case
deontic) relation affecting y.
2) PH (x, Dp, y)
x is not permitted to create a certain modal (in this case
deontic) relation affecting y.
A glance at the last two formulations suggests why we have substituted
Z for P as the modal operator respecting power. It also suggests that the
word permitted can be used in two senses. First, one may be permitted to
bring about a deontic relation in the sense that if one does a certain act in
law, the legal system attaches a legal consequence, that is, it creates the de-
ontic relationship. Second, one may be permitted to bring about a deontic
relation in the sense that if one brings it about by performing the necessary
act in law, he breaches no duty. Using permitted in the first sense, one is
permitted if he is able to affect legal relationships in a given legal context.'
The second sense of the word permitted (the more conventional one, we sub-
mit) is that, to say that one is permitted to bring about a deontic relation
means that he breaches no duty in doing the act in law to which the legal
system attaches legal consequences.
There is no quarrel with using P in the former sense to express the no-
tion of power, but we are doubtful that the use of the letter P in that sense
signifies a deontic relation. Would M, the alethic operator for possibility
be more appropriate?"0 The difficulty we have with M is that we are talking
about legal possibility, not logical possibility. It is not my intention in this
presentation to even attempt to solve this difficulty. I would ask the reader
to reflect whether: (1) P is correct as used by Professor Mullock, 2) M is
correct, or 3) there is some other substitution for Z which more accurately re-
flects the nature of the modal operator for legal power.
Query: Until we can identify with confidence a particular modal op-
erator, would it not be better to use the modal variable Z? Query: does the
system R mentioned in the Anderson article help?"' If we say that "p rele-
vantly implies q," means that "p implies q in a relevant legal system," do we
Is See Appendix H for the meaning of modal operator Z. Mullock supra note 6, would use P.
19 The notion of a given legal context is critical. Is that what the system R means by a
relevant condition? May we use M to designate ability, as L is used to designate necessity
within a relevant legal system; i.e., if a holder does not take for value, it necessarily follows
under the U.C.C. that he is not a holder in due course?
20Id.
[Vol. 13:1
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not use "implies" in a stronger sense than material implication? May we not
say that a result necessarily follows, or necessarily does not follow, in a given
legal system?
If "relevant necessity" may be used to express a statement of law ex-
pressed hypothetically; if juristic fact x then legal consequence y necessarily
follows; then may not "relevant possibility" be used to express power? Rele-
vant possibility means legal ability or legal possibility. Thus, Z H (x, Dp, y)
means x has the legal ability, or it is legally possible that x bring about a
given deontic relation affecting y. Does Z = M (or perhaps Mr" to dis-
tinguish logical possibility, M, from legal possibility)?
APPENDIX I
THE SEMANTIC MUDDLE (UNRAVELED?)
The following is a list of names given to various inferences and pre-
sumptions. The prolixity of names and the penchant of writers to use the
names interchangeably is partially responsible for the confusion in this area.
The use of the term "prima facie case" to designate II, III or IV is of course
a serious obstacle to understanding; as is a similar use of res ipsa loquitur.
I Natural Inference
"Roll your own" inference
II Permissible Inference
Standardized Inference
Permissive Presumption
Presumption of Fact
Prima Facie Case
III Mandatory Inference - rebuttable by enough evidence to sup-
port a jury verdict
Weak Presumption
"Burst the Bubble" Presumption
Tender Presumption
"Smoke em out" Presumption
Prima Facie Case
IV Mandatory Inference - rebuttable by enough evidence to car-
ry burden of persuasion
Strong Presumption
Tough Presumption
Prima Facie Case
V Conclusive Presumption
Mandatory Inference - Nonrebuttable
2 1 Anderson, supra note 6, at 34.
22 M subscript r.
Summer, 1979]
7
Finan: Presumptions and Modal Logic
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 1980
AKRON LAW REVIEW
APPENDIX II
Holfeldian relationships are basically two-term relationships. A table of
the relations follows:
PRIMARY SECONDARY
RELATIONSHIPS RELATIONSHIPS
Right Privilege Power Immunity
JURAL CORRELATIVES
Duty No-right Liability Disability
Right Privilege Power Immunity
JURAL OPPOSITES
No-right Duty Disability Liability
The above jural correlatives each involve two terms; x (an agent) and
y (a patient). The same holds true for privilege, sometimes called a liberty."
If x has a privilege, y has no right that x will not do the privileged act.
Rights and privileges and their correlatives and opposites make up the pri-
mary jural relations. The secondary relations also involve two terms. An
agent and a patient. Thus, if x has a power, y has a liability to have his legal
relationships affected by the exercise of the power. If x has an immunity, y
has a disability to affect the legal relations between himself and x in the
domain where the immunity exists.
Professor Anderson, in using the insights culled from Holfeld, suggests
that there are more than two terms in Hohfeldian relationships, that there
are at least three terms;2 for every relationship involves an agent, a patient
and a state of affairs. The agent and patient are symbolized by x and y, the
state of affairs by p; x, y and p are enclosed within parenthesis. In Ander-
son's formulation, preceding the parenthesis we have a three-place predicate,
H, which joins the three relationships together. Thus H (x, p, y) gives us our
atomic formula over which deontic operators may range, the deontic oper-
ators being 0 for obligation and P for permission. Thus, x is obliged to pay
y would be symbolized, 0 H (x, p, y). x is permitted to pay y would be sym-
bolized by P H (x, p, y).
The Anderson article confines itself to the primary relationships whose
primitive term is duty ("right," "no right" and "privilege" are definable in
terms of duty). The secondary relationship's primitive term is power, (im-
munity, disability and liability may be defined in terms of power). There is
no modal notation in the Anderson article 6 for the notion of power. How-
ever, in the article by Professor Mullock," a symbol is introduced, D, which
symbolizes a deontic relationship. Thus, if x instead of paying p, brings about
the deontic relationship that he (x) ought to pay p (i.e., exercises a power),
23 See DIAS supra note 1, at 35.
,24 Anderson, supra note 6, at 31.
(Vol. 13:1
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we symbolize that by saying H (x, Dp, y), which is a shorthand for H
(x, 0 H (x, p, y), y). In the Mullock article, 218 D is used as a deontic variable
ranging over 0 (obligation) and P (permission). In this article we use the
term D more broadly, as explained below.
If one exercises a power, he frequently brings about a deontic relation-
ship, but he also may bring about a power relationship. Thus, if y has a
power of acceptance and he exercises that power by performing a jural act,
which under applicable law constitutes acceptance, he creates a duty (a de-
ontic relationship) owing to him from the offeror; and if a bilateral contract
is involved, a corresponding duty owing from him to the offeror. Prior to the
offer, however, x had the power to make an offer and thus to create a legal
relationship between himself and y. However, that relationship was not de-
ontic. It involved neither permission nor obligation; rather it involved a
power. x, by exercising his power to make an offer, creates in y another
power and in himself a corresponding liability. It is not clear what is the
correct modal operator symbolizing power. We suggest that Z11 be used.
Professor Mullock uses P."o However, it is submitted that if P is used in the
sense of permission, this is an inaccurate symbolization of power because
we frequently have in law, as well as in morals, situations where an indi-
vidual (x) has a power but a duty not to exercise that power. 1 M (symbol-
izing possibility) is, we submit, a better substitution instance for Z than is
P,32 but it is entirely possible that the appropriate substitution for Z is an as
yet undeveloped modal operator signifying power.
A power may be a power to create a deontic relationship, or the power
to create a secondary relationship; a relationship defined in terms of power.
Thus we use Dp to symbolize not only deontic relationships but also power
relationships (be they alethic or some other modality). Thus, if x has the
power to create a power (i.e., the power to make an offer which will em-
power the offeree to create a deontic relationship by acceptance), his power
would be symbolized Z H (x, Dp, y). The offeree's power to create a deontic
relationship would also be symbolized Z H (x, Dp, y). The suggested sym-
bolism does not distinguish between the power to create a power (alethic?)
relationship and a power to create a deontic relationship. For purposes of
this article on presumptions such a distinction does not seem to be necessary.
25 Anderson, supra note 6.
26 Id.
27 Mullock, supra note 6, at 475.
2 Id.
29 Z is a modal variable ranging over P and 0, M and L, and also X an undefined modal
operator signifying power. L is the Lukasiewicz modal operator for monadic necessity, M
is the Lukasiewicz modal operator for monadic possibility. See D. SNYDER, MODAL LOGIC
(1971) where the notations for LuKAsmwicz's modal operators are set forth,
80 Mullock, supra note 6, at 471, 477.
81 See DIAs, supra note 1, at 56.
;2 See p.24 -25 infra.
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However, if greater refinement is thought necessary, Ap instead of Dp might
be used for power relationships.
We have treated a power to create a power (or some other secondary
relationship defined in terms of power) as itself a power. Not all agree. It
is stated by Stone3 that "A's 'power'" to mail a letter to B offering to buy
Whiteacre from B for 1,000 pounds" is not a power in the Hohfeldian sense,
since it does not "change B's legal relations."" It is merely a "physical abili-
ty" and a "legal privilege (or liberty)."" In order to take this (Stone's)
view, one would have to exclude power from the definition of a legal rela-
tionship. But surely, we submit, one who has a power to make a will contain-
ing a power of appointment has the power to create a legal relationship be-
tween the donee of the power and those who are liable to the donee's exer-
cise of it. Referring to Stone, quoted above," Dias states that Stone "seems
to assume that liability [to the exercise of a power] necessarily contemplates
a change for the worse. That is not what Hohfeld meant by it.""1
Resolution of this dispute is necessary in dealing with the notion of the
duty of a judge not to exercise his power to empower the jury to create a
deontic relationship; 8 for if the judge lacks the power to empower the jury,3
it makes little sense to speak of his duty not to do the impossible.
In siding with the position that a power to create a power is itself a
power, we have created a difficulty in symbolizing power which would not be
present if Stone's definition were accepted. If one has a power to create a
power and the created power is itself a power to create a deontic relation-
ship, we must have a notational device to represent two power relationships
and one deontic relationship. This creates difficulties which are not present
when Dp symbolizes only a deontic relationship. By enlarging the definition
of Dp to include "power" relationships, we have created the following diffi-
culty.
When Dp is a symbol for a "power" relationship, Dp by definition 0
equals Z H (x (y, Dp, x), y). Thus Dp is found in both the definiens and the
definiendum. Obviously the power to create another power is a power to
create some other power than the one being exercised. Dp in the definiendum
represents a different power than does Dp in the definiens. It might be de-
sirable to introduce a notation to make this distinction, but we believe that
context makes the meaning clear and that the introduction of an additional
as J. STONE, LEGAL SYSTEMS AND LAWYERS' REASONING 147 (1964).
34id. a5d. 86 Id.
37DIAs, supra note 1, at 48 n.l.
8s See p. 5 infra.
as For a discussion of a power and a duty not to exercise it, see Dus, supra note 1, at 56-
58. For a full discussion, read DIAs at 47-58.
40 It should be remembered that Pp i$ ; variable which represents either a "different power"
pr a deontic relationship.
[Vol. 13:1
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notation would be an unnecessary refinement, at least for the purpose of this
article which is limited to exploring the nature of presumptions.
Hohfeld's primary relationships formulated in terms of deontic logic
follow. Notice that there are two formulations for each relationship and that
each of these formulations is equivalent to its companion formulation. No-
tice also that negatives are added in accordance with modem corrections. "
Right
O H (x, p, y)
PH-(x, p, y)
Duty to do
OH (x, p, y)
PH (x, p, y)
No Right
(y has no right that x do)
OH (x, p, y)
P H(x,p, y)
Privilege
PH (x, p, y)
OH (x, p,y)
No Right
(y has no right that x not do)
PH (x, p, y)
0H (x, p, y)
Duty (not to do)
PH (x, p, y)
OH (x, p,y)
The above table is reproduced below using non-symbolic language.
(Demand) Right Privilege
y has a demand right that x is permitted to do p,
x do p - x is not permitted "against" y -
not to do p for y x has no duty not to do
p "against" y
Duty
x has a duty to do p
for y - x is not permitted
not to do p for y
No Right
y has no demand right that
x do p - x is permitted
not to do p for y
No Right
x is permitted to do p against
y - x is not obliged not to do
P "against" y
Duty
x is not permitted to do p against
y - x is obliged not to do p
against y
41 See G. CHRISTIE, JURISPRUDENCE 814-15 (1973).
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So duty is different when it is a correlative of demand right than when
it is the opposite of privilege. Duty means respectively:
O H (x, p, y)- OH (x, p, y)
PH (x, p, y) -PH (x, p, y)
No right is different when it is the opposite of a demand right than when
it is the correlative of privilege. No right means respectively:
OH (x, p, y) -OH (x, p, y)
PH (x, p, y) - PH (x, p, y)
One advantage of formulating basic jural relations in symbolic terms
is that a square of opposition can be created. The obvious advantage of a
square is that it allows the drawing of immediate inferences. The square for
the primary relations follows:
SQUARE OF OPPOSITION
A E
OH (x,p,y) OH (x,p,y)
"PH (x, p, y) PH (x, p, y)
I 0
PH (x,p, y) OH (x, p, y)
OH(x, p, y) PI H(x, p, y)
A E
Duty (to do) Duty (not to do)
I 0
Privilege (to do) Privilege (not to do)
The above meets the criteria for a square because:
A and E can both be false but not both true.
I and 0 can both be true but not both false.
A and 0 cannot both be true or both be false,
they are contradictories.
E and I cannot both be true or both be false,
they too are contradictories.
An example of an immediate inference using the above is:
If it is false that x has a duty to do p (i.e., if A is
false), then x has a privilege not to do p (i.e., if 0
is true). In symbolic form this inference reads:
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PRESUMPTIONS AND MODAL LOGIC
OH (x, p, y) ) P H (x, p, y)
Although the development of deontic logic greatly aids in analysis, it
should be noted that according to Dias, Jeremy Bentham (1748 - 1832),
"evolved a 'deontic logic' with which to demonstrate the relationship be-
tween command, prohibition and permission." 2
Decided aspects--obligative
Command (C)
Positive directive
(Do X)
Prohibition (P)
Negative directive
(Do not do X)
Non-prohibition (NP)
Negative non-directive
(Permission to do X)
Non-command (NC)
Positive non-directive
(Permission not to do X)
Undecided aspects-unobligative43
SECONDARY RELATIONSHIPS IN SYMBOLIC FORM
PH (x, Dp, y)
x has power over y
PH (x, Dp, y)
y has a liability to x's power
P H (x, Dp, y)
x has a disability to affect
y's rights
PH (x, Dp, y)
y has an immunity against
x's power
PH (x, Dp, y)
x has a disability to affect
y's right
P H (x, Dp, y)
y is liable to x's power
42 DIAS, supra note 1, at 462.
'3 Id.
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